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[Penultimate draft of a paper that was eventually published 
in Episteme 12 (2015): 145–53; please cite that version.] 
Abstract: I argue that Alvin Goldman has failed to save process reliabilism 
from my critique in earlier work of consequentialist or teleological epistemic 
theories. First, Goldman misconstrues the nature of my challenge: two of the 
cases he discusses I never claimed to be counterexamples to process reliabilism. 
Second, Goldman’s reply to the type of case I actually claimed to be a 
counterexample to process reliabilism is unsuccessful. He proposes a variety of 
responses, but all of them either feature an implausible restriction on process 
types, or fail to rule out cases with the sort of structure that generates the worry, 
or both. 
I believe that a commitment to the epistemic analogue of consequentialist (or teleological) theories 
in ethics is pervasive in contemporary epistemology. These epistemic theories (i) take the good to be prior 
to the right in epistemology and (ii) explain epistemic rightness in terms of epistemic goodness via a 
promoting (or conducing) relation. Characterized thusly, epistemic consequentialism encompasses a wide 
array of currently popular theories, cutting across many of the familiar divides, including internalism vs. 
externalism, foundationalism vs. coherentism, and virtue- vs. belief-focused epistemology. But perhaps the 
most prominent instance of a consequentialist epistemic theory is process reliabilism, which I see as the 
epistemic analogue of satisficing hedonistic rule-utilitarianism (where instead of evaluating whether an action is 
based on a rule that does sufficiently well at promoting pleasure, we evaluate whether a belief is formed via a 
process that does sufficiently well at promoting true belief). 
 I also believe that this widespread commitment to consequentialism in epistemology is a mistake. 
My strategy for arguing against epistemic consequentialism has three stages (see Berker 2013a, 2013b). 
First, I consider certain counterexamples to extremely crude versions of epistemic consequentialism 
originally due to Roderick Firth (1981, 1998). Call these ‘Firth cases’. Second, I use the analogy with 
consequentialist theories in ethics to unearth the structural features that make Firth cases work the way 
they do. Third, I show how almost all forms of epistemic consequentialism sometimes allow a belief’s 
epistemic status to depend on those same structural features, thereby giving me a recipe for generating 
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counterexamples to even very sophisticated forms of epistemic consequentialism. Call the examples 
generated in this third stage ‘Firth-inspired cases’. They go beyond anything we find in Firth’s work, but, 
if I am right, they demonstrate the same underlying insight that led Firth to propose his own cases. 
 Since most epistemic consequentialists develop their theories in a way that allows them to deflect 
Firth cases, it is the second and third stages of my strategy that are crucial. The basic idea is to argue that 
all interesting forms of epistemic consequentialism condone (or mandate) the epistemic analogue of 
cutting up one innocent person in order to use her organs to save the lives of five people.1 The difficult 
part is figuring out exactly what the epistemic analogue of cutting up the one to save the five consists in. 
This requires careful attention to the structure of Firth cases, so that we can use that structure to generate 
Firth-inspired counterexamples to the varieties of epistemic consequentialism one actually encounters in 
the literature. 
 In ‘Epistemic Teleology and the Separateness of Propositions’ (written in 2009), I postulated that 
the structural feature underlying Firth cases is this: the promotion of epistemic good with regard to one 
proposition is sacrificed in order to greatly benefit the promotion of epistemic good with regard to many 
other propositions. In slogan form: theories that run afoul of Firth’s original examples do so because they 
‘ignore the separateness of propositions’. In ‘The Rejection of Epistemic Consequentialism’ (written two 
years later), I changed my mind and decided that although the structural feature of ignoring the 
separateness of propositions suffices to generate problems for many consequentialist theories in 
epistemology, there is an even more general structural feature subsuming that structural feature which 
allows us to generate problem cases even for those consequentialist epistemic theories which adhere to the 
separateness of propositions. I am still struggling to figure out the best way to characterize this more 
general structural feature. But that won’t matter for the purposes of this note: all of the theories I will be 
considering flout the separateness of propositions, so there will be no need to go beyond my initial 
diagnosis. 
 Alvin Goldman is the father of process reliabilism, so it is not surprising that he finds my criticism 
                                                      
1  I refer here, of course, to a famous problem case for act-utilitarianism originally due to Judith Jarvis Thomson (1976: 206). 
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of epistemic consequentialism in general, and of process reliabilism in particular, unpersuasive. Goldman 
argues in ‘Reliabilism, Veritism, and Epistemic Teleology’ that the form of process reliabilism he favors 
can avoid my Firth-inspired attack. What exactly is process reliabilism? Here some terminology will help. 
Goldman (1979: 38) thinks of a process as ‘a functional operation or procedure, i.e., something that generates a 
mapping from certain states—“inputs”—into other states—“outputs” ’. In the case of cognitive processes, the 
output states are all beliefs.2 On the input end, we can distinguish between belief-independent processes, 
which take no belief-states as inputs, and belief-dependent processes, which take at least some belief-states as 
inputs. We can also distinguish between process tokens and process types in the usual manner. It is process 
types, not process tokens, which are assessed for reliability, and there are two ways of doing this, 
depending on whether the process is belief-independent or -dependent: 
A belief-independent process type is reliable iff its tokens tend to yield a sufficiently high ratio of true to 
false (token) output beliefs. 
A belief-dependent process type is conditionally reliable iff its tokens tend, when their (token) input 
beliefs are all true, to yield a sufficiently high ratio of true to false (token) output beliefs. 
Process reliabilism may then be defined recursively as follows:3 
process reliabilism: 
i. If S’s (token) belief that p at t results (‘immediately’) from a belief-independent process token 
whose relevant process type is reliable, then S’s belief that p at t is justified. 
ii. If S’s (token) belief that p at t results (‘immediately’) from a belief-dependent process token 
whose relevant process type is conditionally reliable, and if the other belief tokens on which 
this process token operated are themselves justified, then S’s belief that p at t is justified. 
iii. Otherwise, S’s (token) belief that p at t is unjustified. 
How do we determine the ‘relevant’ process type for a given process token? This, of course, is the dreaded 
generality problem for reliabilism.4 
Goldman’s reply to my anti-teleological argument consists in arguing that three of my cases are 
                                                      
2  Since I will not be discussing non-cognitive processes in this note, hereafter whenever I write ‘process’ I mean ‘cognitive 
process’. 
3  What follows is almost exactly the formulation of process reliabilism that appears in Goldman 1979: 40–41, except that I 
have been explicit about the token vs. type distinction in the way proposed in Feldman 1985: 160–62. 
4  Goldman himself noted this problem in Goldman 1979: 39, but since then it has been forcefully pressed by Earl Conee and 
Richard Feldman (see Feldman 1985; Conee and Feldman 1998; Feldman and Conee 2002; and Conee 2013). I agree with 
Conee and Feldman that the generality problem is an unsolved problem for process reliabilists, but I do not wish to rest my 
criticism of process reliabilism on that problem, since it does not generalize to all forms of epistemic consequentialism. 
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not counterexamples to process reliabilism: the grant-seeking scientist case (a Firth case whose specific 
formulation I take from Fumerton 2001), the sick mathematician case (another Firth case), and the prime 
numbers case (a Firth-inspired case customized to cause trouble for process reliabilism). Much of what 
Goldman says about these specific cases strikes me as correct. However, in restricting his reply to an 
assessment of these three cases, Goldman has failed to adequately address my anti-teleological strategy, for 
two reasons. First, I never claimed that Firth cases are counterexamples to process reliabilism. Second, 
Goldman’s argument that the prime numbers case (and others like it) do not present problems for process 
reliabilists is uncompelling. 
All Firth cases involve a seemingly unjustified belief being a causal means of promoting, sometime 
in the future, the acquisition of numerous true beliefs by the subject.5 Firth cases are not counterexamples 
to process reliabilism, since in the definitions of unconditional and conditional reliability, ‘yield’ should be 
interpreted to mean ‘immediately yield’. All that matters for an assessment of either type of reliability is 
the truth-ratio of the token belief-states directly brought about by token instances of the process type being 
evaluated; any other token belief-states causally downstream from those token belief-states are irrelevant. 
So I agree with Goldman that the grant-seeking scientist and sick mathematician cases are not 
counterexamples to process reliabilism. In fact, I explicitly said as much in my two articles.6 
                                                      
5  Or, at least, this is what Firth cases involve after we restrict the relevant epistemic end to true belief. (Firth himself discusses 
cases in which it is future knowledge, not merely future true belief, that is promoted.) In my work I call the view that the final ends 
in epistemology are true belief and the avoidance of false belief ‘veritism’, a term I say in Berker 2013a: 360 that I ‘adapt[ed]’ 
from Goldman. Goldman (2015: 139–40) takes issue with my using ‘veritism’ to cover process reliabilism and insists that, as he 
uses the term, it refers only to the complete consequentialist theory of social epistemology defended in Goldman 1999a. However, 
this does not fit with Goldman’s use of that term elsewhere in his work. As early as Goldman 1987: 122, he defines veritism as the 
view that ‘true belief [is] the ultimate epistemic aim’, a view which (a) is as much suited to individual epistemology as it is to social 
epistemology, and (b) is naturally seen as one component of process reliabilism (it specifies that theory’s account of final value, in 
my tripartite way of dividing up consequentialist theories). Similar comments apply to Goldman’s use of the term ‘veritism’ in 
Goldman 2001. 
6  In Berker 2013a: 375, I wrote, ‘For this reason [namely, the fact that process reliabilists restrict the conducing relation to 
proximate causal means], none of the trade-off cases I have discussed so far pose a problem for the process reliabilist’. I say 
something similar in Berker 2013b: 374. Note that in both places I am referring not just to the original versions of the grant-
seeking scientist and sick mathematician cases, but also to the tweaked versions of those cases in which we make the situations 
faced by the scientist and mathematician commonplace in their world. Thus it is simply a misreading on Goldman’s part to hold 
that I think the tweaked versions of those cases are counterexamples to process reliabilism due to the true beliefs causally 
downstream from the direct outputs of the processes in question. 
 (This last qualification is crucial when it comes to the case of the sick mathematician. All I am claiming here is that the sick 
mathematician is a not a counterexample to process reliabilism in virtue of the true beliefs causally brought about by the mathematician’s belief 
that she will recover. Depending on how we individuate process types, it may well be the case that the sick mathematician is a 
counterexample to process reliabilism in virtue of the fact that the mathematician’s belief that she will recover has a causal impact on its own truth. 
However, I won’t be pressing that point in the current note. For discussion, see Berker 2013b: 376–77.)  
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 But process reliabilists are not so easily off the hook. Note the structure of Firth cases: they involve 
forgoing the promotion of true belief with regard to one proposition in order to greatly benefit the 
promotion of true belief with regard to many other propositions. In Firth’s original cases, the item doing 
the forgoing and promoting is a belief token. However, that same underlying structure can also apply to 
cases in which something else, such as a process type, is sacrificing its performance with regard to one 
proposition in order to promote its performance with regard to many other propositions. For this reason, 
process reliabilism sometimes allows the structure at work in Firth cases to be normatively relevant, and 
when it does, I claim, it reaches an incorrect verdict. My prime numbers example is supposed to be one 
(but only one) case of this sort. 
 Here was my initial description of the case: ‘Suppose that whenever I consider whether a given 
natural number n is prime, I form the following belief: <n is not prime>’.7 The general structure of the 
case—which I will call ‘structure S’—was intended to be as follows:8 
structure S: 
a. There is a belief-independent process, X, which outputs beliefs in a range of propositions, 
R. 
b. There is a partition of R into two subsets, R1 and R2, such that: 
• when X outputs a belief in a proposition in R1, that belief is always false; 
• when X outputs a belief in a proposition in R2, that belief is always true; 
• R1 is much smaller than R2. 
c. As a result, X is extremely reliable. 
Why are cases with structure S problematic for process reliabilism? Let us refer to the propositions in R1 
as ‘the few’ and the propositions in R2 as ‘the many’. Intuitively,9 when a subject uses X to form a belief in 
one of the few, that belief is not thereby justified: X’s poor performance with regard to the few is not 
redeemed by its excellent performance with regard to the many. But process reliabilism appears to yield 
                                                      
7  Berker 2013a: 375. The case reappears in Berker 2013b: 374–75. 
8  Here I suppress the type/token distinction, for readability’s sake. 
9  I am using ‘intuitively’ here as a placeholder for the proper means, whatever it is, by which we come to correct epistemic 
verdicts about particular-case scenarios. Skeptics of intuition can feel free to replace that word with a reference to their favorite 
alternative. (What if there is no way of properly coming to correct epistemic verdicts about particular-case scenarios? Well, then 
epistemology is doomed, and this entire exchange between me and Goldman is moot.) 
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the verdict that such a belief is justified. 
 Goldman is not moved by this case. He presents a scattershot of possible responses. Two of these 
we can immediately set aside. First, Goldman (in effect) points out—quite correctly—that (c) only follows 
from (a) and (b) in S if we make an additional assumption, such as: 
d. X tends to output beliefs in a given proposition in R1 about as often as it tends to output beliefs in 
a given proposition in R2. 
Moreover, he doubts that (d) is true of the case as I describe it. Goldman (2015: 141) writes, ‘In all 
likelihood, people who use this process type apply it exclusively or primarily to relatively small integers. 
Within that class of numbers, however, the truth-ratio of the process will not be very high, because many 
small integers are prime’. But this is at most an objection to my particular attempt to describe a case with 
features (a), (b), and (c), not to the very possibility of there existing a case with that structure. So let us 
stipulate that instead of the process being one that yields belief in propositions of the form <n is not 
prime> for arbitrary values of n, it only yields belief in propositions of that form for values of n that are at 
least three digits.10 It is easy enough to imagine a case of that sort for which assumption (d) is true. Second, 
Goldman notes—quite correctly—that in many of his writings on process reliabilism he makes a 
distinction between belief-forming processes and belief-forming methods which my example appears to 
neglect. In Goldman’s words: 
‘Processes’ are basic psychological processes, roughly, wired-in features of our native cognitive architecture. 
‘Methods’ are learnable algorithms, heuristics, or procedures for forming beliefs, such as procedures that 
appeal to instrument readings, or statistical analyses.11 
Process reliabilism, Goldman insists, is only intended to be an account of the justifiedness of beliefs formed 
entirely on the basis of processes; for beliefs formed at least partially on the basis of methods, the account of 
justifiedness is allegedly more complicated, and in particular involves assessing whether the subject 
acquired the relevant methods in an appropriate manner.12 Moreover, the prime numbers case, as I 
described it, may seem to involve a consciously applied rule for forming beliefs about the primeness of 
                                                      
10   And, we might add, at most thirty digits, to obviate any worries concerning infinities. 
11   Goldman 1988: 53. See also Goldman 1986: 93–95, 1987: 131, 1999b: 14, and 2012b: 5. 
12   Thus on this proposal, we should interpret ‘results’ to mean ‘entirely results’ in clauses (i) and (ii) of my statement of process 
reliabilism, and clause (iii) needs to be reformulated. 
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natural numbers, and hence may seem to feature a belief-forming method, not a belief-forming process. 
But, again, this is at most an objection to my particular attempt to describe a case with structure S, not to 
the very possibility of there existing a case with that structure. We can easily change the case so that it 
features a subject with a ‘wired-in’ feature of her ‘native cognitive architecture’ that allows her to form 
beliefs about the primeness of natural numbers in the way specified. And when we do, I claim, that does 
not affect our judgments about the case: it is still implausible to hold that beliefs in the few formed on the 
basis of this process are justified.13 
 Goldman has a third reply to the prime numbers example which is more promising than the 
other two.14 This reply involves, in effect, denying that the process type specified in the example is an 
epistemically relevant one. Goldman notes that in his first article defending process reliabilism, he suggested 
that relevant process types should be restricted to those that are ‘content-neutral’ (Goldman 1979: 39). 
This restriction was designed to rule out processes such as the following: inferring <p> from <The Pope 
asserted that p>.15 And, Goldman insists, that same restriction rules out the process in my prime numbers 
case. 
 I am not convinced. I will now argue that depending on how we interpret the proposed restriction 
to content-neutral process types, either that restriction is extremely implausible (call this ‘the plausibility 
problem’), or it fails to rule out problem cases with the relevant structure (call this ‘the effectiveness 
problem’), or both.16 
                                                      
13   Objection: The new version of the prime numbers case features a process type that is not instantiated in the actual world. 
But ‘the domain we select for determining a process-type’s reliability is the actual world (plus, perhaps, a class of relevantly nearby 
possible worlds)’ (Goldman 2015: 141). So process reliabilists are not forced to say that the process type in this new version of the 
case is reliable. 
  Reply: We should distinguish between the following two claims: (1) we need to look to the actual world (and certain nearby 
worlds) when selecting a relevant process type, and (2) when determining whether an already selected process type is reliable, we 
do so by seeing how reliable it would be if embedded in the actual world (and certain nearby worlds). Presumably in this 
quotation Goldman is only putting forward the second claim. Otherwise process reliabilism has no way of assessing beliefs formed 
on the basis of process types that are not actually instantiated. And if process reliabilism has no way of assessing beliefs formed on 
the basis of process types that are not actually instantiated, then so much the worse for process reliabilism. 
14   Although Goldman presents this third reply in the same paragraph as his reply involving an appeal to the process/method 
distinction, I take it that these two replies are logically distinct from one another. 
15   That is, a process which takes as input a belief in the proposition <The Pope asserted that p> and yields as output a belief 
in the proposition <p>. Such a process is problematic if we agree that a belief formed (or sustained) on the basis of that process is 
not justified, even if, as a matter of fact, the Pope happens to be infallible. 
16   A similar objection applies to David Copp’s (2014: 88–90) attempt to defend his own brand of epistemic teleology against 
my criticisms by appealing to an optimality condition together with what he calls ‘the learnability constraint’ and ‘the generic 
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 It is very unclear what content-neutrality comes to. In his initial discussion of the content-neutral 
restriction, Goldman (1979: 39) defined content-neutrality as follows: 
proposal #1: A process is content-neutral iff it ‘admit[s] as input beliefs (or other states) with any 
content’. 
When content-neutrality is understood in this way, the resulting restriction on process types faces a 
plausibility problem. In particular, many of Goldman’s own examples of relevant process types would be 
ruled out by this version of the content-neutral restriction, including ‘sight’, ‘hearing’, ‘ignoring contrary 
evidence’, ‘beliefs based on inference from observed samples’, and ‘accepting the reports of others’.17 
None of these examples involve input states with arbitrary contents. This first way of interpreting the 
content-neutral restriction also faces an effectiveness problem. Because it proposes no constraints on the 
content of output beliefs, the restriction fails to rule out the process type in the prime numbers case. (My 
description of that case is silent on the content of the inputs to the process described, if indeed those inputs 
even have content.) To avoid this last problem, we might switch to 
proposal #2: A process is content-neutral iff it admits as input beliefs (or other states) with any 
content and admits as output beliefs with any content. 
This alteration helps with the effectiveness problem, but now we have a drastic plausibility problem. Pretty 
much the only process type that satisfies the content-neutral restriction under this interpretation is 
deductive inference.18 
 Goldman (2015: 141) has now changed his definition of content-neutrality to 
proposal #3: A process is content-neutral iff it ‘take[s] [states with] many different contents as 
inputs (and as outputs)’. 
Presumably ‘many different’ refers not just to the number of different contents—the process in my prime 
numbers case does very well by that count—but also to the diversity of those contents. Under this 
interpretation the content-neutrality restriction is less implausible (though perhaps misnamed: ‘content-
flexible’ strikes me as a more accurate term than ‘content-neutral’ for the notion being glossed here). 
                                                                                                                                                                              
solution constraint’. 
17   The first three of these I take from Goldman 1992: 158, the fourth from Goldman 1979: 38, and the fifth from Goldman 
1999a: 129. 
18   And maybe not even that, if it turns out that deductive reasoning in humans is domain-specific, a possibility about which 
Goldman wishes to remain uncommitted (see Goldman 1999b: 17–19). 
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However, this version of the restriction is beset by an effectiveness problem. It is easy enough to tweak the 
prime numbers case so as to make process X content-neutral in the sense proposed: just keep adding extra 
propositions which are not of the form <n is not prime> into R2 (the set of propositions that X always gets 
correct) until a desired level of diversity is achieved. This change does not, I claim, alter our verdicts about 
the case. 
 Thus I am not convinced by the three replies we have considered to my prime numbers 
example.19 More generally, we can separate two issues with regard to that case. First, we may ask, ‘Does 
process reliabilism allow cases with structure S to exist?’ Second, we may ask, ‘If cases with structure S 
exist, would they be a problem for process reliabilism?’ Goldman seems to be conceding that the answer 
to the second of these questions is ‘Yes’. His strategy is to resist the example by attempting to answer ‘No’ 
to the first question. But this strikes me as a not-very-promising strategy. When R ranges over necessary 
propositions, cases with structure S are a dime a dozen—as we have seen, from the failure of Goldman’s 
various replies to rule out cases with that structure. Moreover, if we let R range over contingent 
propositions and change ‘always’ to ‘almost always’ in clause (b), then cases with the resulting structure are 
also a dime a dozen. Finally, we can change ‘belief-independent’ to ‘belief-dependent’ in clause (a) and 
make accompanying changes in clause (b) to generate yet more cases with a problematic structure. So 
really structure S is a template for a vast number of ways in which a process type might forgo success with 
regard to certain propositional outputs in order to achieve great success with regard to many other 
propositional outputs. We can imagine cases of this sort involving not just mathematical processes, but 
also perceptual processes, introspective processes, inferential processes—the list goes on. I think it is 
striking how resistant we are to saying that such cases involve a ‘sacrifice for the greater epistemic good’, 
                                                      
19   What about Goldman’s fourth proposed response, in which he appeals to what he now calls ‘the approved-list version of 
reliabilism’—and what he used to call ‘two-stage reliabilism’ (Goldman 1992, 1999b)—in order to reach ‘the correct verdict’ 
about the prime numbers case, namely that a belief in <7 is not prime> on the basis of process X is not justified (Goldman 2015: 
142)? In offering this response, Goldman is, in my opinion, misapplying his own theory. What Goldman and I are debating here 
is the viability of process reliabilism as a theory of what in fact makes a belief justified (i.e. as a theory in ‘normative scientific 
epistemology’, as Goldman [1992: 156] calls it). But in his writings, Goldman only offers approved-list reliabilism as a theory of how 
the folk make judgments about whether a belief is justified (i.e. as a theory in ‘epistemic folkways’ or ‘descriptive scientific epistemology’, as 
Goldman [1992: 155–56] calls it)—which is all for the better, since approved-list reliabilism is not remotely plausible as a theory 
of what in fact makes a belief justified. So appealing to approved-list reliabilism is not a way of establishing the ‘correct verdict’ 
which Goldman hopes to secure; at most it is a way of establishing that such a verdict is part of our folk theory of justified belief. 
Moreover, I make no claims in my work about whether epistemic consequentialism accurately captures our folk theory of justified 
belief, since in my opinion folk epistemology is of limited philosophical interest. 
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in the way in which an act-consequentialist might deem a cutting up of the one to save the five as a 
sacrifice for the greater moral good. This judgment of ours about the justificatory status of beliefs formed 
(or sustained) on the basis of processes with structures similar to S is not, I claim, merely a folk verdict, but 
rather is a persistent considered judgment that survives reflective scrutiny. And it is a judgment which 
Goldman seems to share. I conclude that Goldman has not successfully shown that process reliabilism 
avoids my charge that the view illicitly ignores the separateness of propositions.20 
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